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Subjectivity in Incentive Pay 
 
I investigate the determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentive pay. New forms of 
incentive pay are increasingly being introduced by company management – for 
example, bonuses are now linked to wider business goals, such as quality and customer 
service, company reputation and employee hiring and retention policies, replacing the 
traditional focus on output or profit measures. A new conceptual work on subjectivity is 
used to evaluate these incentive pay practices. The analysis shows that a variety of 
contextual factors influence the organizations to make greater use of subjectivity in 
incentive pay. I also discuss the performance effects of subjectivity.  
 
The literature on incentives emphasizes the importance of choosing appropriate 
performance measures in employee compensation plans. A suitable performance 
measure aligns the interests of employees with those of the company through its effect 
on the pay-performance relation. However, research has shown the difficulty often 
encountered in tying managerial incentives to exact performance metrics. The problem 
was first highlighted by Steven Kerr in his work published in 1975 in the Academy of 
Management Journal, entitled ‘On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B’.  
 
For instance, commonly used objective measures such as output and profit may give a 
distorted picture of the level of effort put forth by employees. They are typically either 
too narrow (e.g. department accounting performance measures for managers able to 
affect a firm’s performance beyond their unit) or too broad (e.g. company-wide 
performance measures influenced by all employees). Bonus schemes were traditionally 
regarded as a means of improving company performance through a set of profit or 
productivity targets. However, the practice to date shows that simply adding a bonus 
component into a total compensation plan does not produce a more motivated 
employee, but one more likely to make decisions that produce results to ensure their 
end-of-year payout. Another difficulty is that it is often impracticable to separate out 
the specific contribution of employees to improvements in company performance.   
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Subsequent research has therefore been concerned with designing innovative bonus 
pay plans that can overcome some of these inherent inefficiencies. One such advance is 
the development of bonus pay plans linked to business goals that are increasingly 
becoming a common economy-wide practice. The success of these new plans critically 
depends upon the discretion of management, in contrast to formula-based bonus plans, 
in deciding the extent to which the intended business goals have been achieved. 
Subjectivity therefore takes centre stage in ensuring the value component of variable 
compensation schemes. 
 
Subjectivity plays a particularly important role in incentive schemes, reducing 
employee risk and increasing the alignment of interests between the employee and the 
employer. Subjective decisions are common in unpredictable environments as it is 
difficult to write complete contracts because of unforeseen contingencies. Similarly, 
complex work environments, where the job design involves multiple tasks require 
significant subjective judgements. Despite its importance, subjectivity is still largely an 
unexplored phenomenon, including such issues as when companies make greater use of 
subjectivity in assigning bonus rewards. The literature on subjectivity as such is sparse, 
though management theorists have frequently tackled related issues under the rubric of 
quality management and non-financial performance measures. 
    
In this article I provide a discussion of the causes and effects of subjectivity in 
employee incentive systems, in particular in discretionary bonus pay plans. I examine 
many ways in which subjectivity should theoretically play a role. Empirical 
implications of these concepts are also explored. The research reported here draws 
upon two disparate sets of literature on performance measurement: it makes extensive  
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use of accounting and management literature on non-financial performance measures 
as well as recent economics literature on subjectivity. I organize the article as follows. 
In the next section I delineate the research questions and explain their significance in 
relation to performance evaluation practices in a variety of organizational settings. This 
is followed by a survey of the literature on subjectivity and relevant research 
propositions. Conclusions and scope for future research are discussed in the final 
section.  
 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEMS 
 
Traditional incentive pay often took the form of commissions, or profit-related pay, or 
the payment of a large annual bonus. Empirical research into evaluating the 
productivity effects of these practices have found that these schemes work better if 
there is employee participation and if the variable component represents a sizeable 
share of an employee’s compensation (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990; Collins, 1998). 
However, research has also revealed the limitations of using such incentive schemes for 
better performance outcomes. The difficulty is with the hypothetical links between 
rewards and performance. For example, the general hypothesis made about the efficacy 
of a pay plan rests on its perceived effect on employee performance and satisfaction. 
This effect is believed to be positive when rewards enter into the equation. The 
association between the level of performance and the level and/or probability of reward 
provides the necessary ingredient for incentive pay plans to play a useful role in 
increasing employee performance.  
 
However, in practice employees are often uncertain about the extent to which these  
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supposed links actually exist. Both economic and organizational psychology studies 
suggest that financial measures such as profits and costs provide weak direction to 
workers and make it difficult to communicate how an employee’s actions affect 
performance goals (Wruck and Jensen, 1994). If such ambiguities persist, employee 
commitment to performance targets may wear off, resulting in a wide divergence 
between desirable and actual performance achievement. Such pay-performance 
non-linearities force companies to find alternative methods that tie rewards more 
closely to performance. 
 
Similarly, the choice of suitable performance measures poses difficult implementation 
problems. For example, the success of bonus schemes such as gain sharing plans 
depends, in great part, on designing the appropriate formula. Profit measures used in 
profit sharing schemes may incorporate many discretionary decisions about such 
matters as the valuation of stock, the assessment of depreciation, and the valuation of 
work in progress (Gaver and Austin, 1995). The motivation for the selection of 
financial measures is rooted in economic reasoning, for it is understood that the 
informativeness of performance measures is a key relevant criteria (Ittner and Larcker, 
2002; Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, Heneman et al stress the measures’ 
controllability and the tradeoffs between their motivational value and the firm’s ability 
to pay bonuses (Heneman, Ledford and Gresham, 1999). 
 
Behavioral research also indicates that performance measures may, in fact, be selected 
under the influence of various competing stakeholder groups. An interdisciplinary 
review of performance measurement literature by Waggoner et al notes that 
organizations are ‘political arenas’ in which divergent constituencies attempt to  
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institutionalize performance criteria that serve their interests (Waggoner and Neely and 
Kennerley, 1999). For instance, operational efficiency in many organizational settings 
is a very wide term. It has different connotations for various groups that have an interest 
in the performance of commercial organizations such as investors, management, 
customers, staff, government, and the local community in the area of operation, 
including non-customers. Thus, no single yardstick can serve the purpose of measuring 
operational efficiency, since this may vary according to the interests of different 
concerns. The potential conflicts that arise as various constituencies try to promote 
self-interested performance measures tend to be resolved through the use of power and 
bargaining. 
  
Because of this interplay between different stakeholder groups, companies may opt for 
measures such as attracting and retaining key personnel or customer satisfaction, 
sometimes in collaboration with trade unions and, at times, under external market 
influences. This is most obvious when companies select multiple performance 
measures to reflect the varying degrees of managerial emphasis driven by competing 
interests. Factors such as the creation of, and demand for, employee skill, the relative 
power of different occupational groups, and the wider market concerns for quality and 
customer service may all be represented, one way or another, in performance 
evaluation systems. 
 
Compensation and reward specialists also have come to recognize that conventional 
accounting-based measures such as levels and rates of profitability, growth in sales, and 
ratios of cash balances may not be entirely suited to the changed environments. With 
the advent of new technologies, such as the Internet, and the increasing intensity of  
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market competition, the concept of efficiency has come to acquire a wider meaning: it 
is more broad-based, and the measures or indicators chosen now aim to throw light on 
the varied facets of an organization’s performance relevant to the current climate (see 
Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Employee performance measures. 
Traditional Performance Measures  New Performance Measures 
Indices of performance include: 
· rates of profitability 
· growth in sales (e.g. the amount 
of credit per employee, the 
number of computers sold) 
· output levels (e.g. projector 
slides) 
Indices of performance include: 
· customer service 
· leadership 
· teamwork 
· quality standards 
· operational objectives 
· health & safety 
 
Recent trends in bonus payouts reflect companies’ desire to avoid the potentially 
distorting effects of focusing too much on a single measure such as profit or output. 
Therefore, a wide range of factors is increasingly being introduced to cover a broader 
set of business objectives. This is based on the realization that bonuses linked to other 
components of wages and employee benefits and tied into the culture of the 
organization are far more effective than those which are not. Although considerations 
such as financial and output considerations remain important, bonus pay plans are now 
overwhelmingly oriented toward incorporating measures such as attendance, customer 
service, quality, safety, team work and various other HR-related measures.  
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This new emphasis on tying bonuses to multiple business objectives can take different 
forms. For instance, it is possible to operate several bonus schemes providing 
appropriate incentives for different employee groups, while also operating 
corporate-level schemes to reward all staff for the overall performance of the company. 
One such scheme is the multi-factor, multi-level bonus plan. The growing popularity of 
this practice is mainly caused by the fact that both personal and corporate level factors 
are important for providing optimal incentives in new industrial environments. Thus, 
targets can be set for specific jobs, teams or departments, alongside company-wide 
elements. At Toshiba Information Systems, output is measured against monthly and 
quarterly schedules (IDS, 2003). Within these boundaries, employees can exert control 
over the local targets, while, at the same time, appropriate links are also made to the 
organization’s overall performance.  
 
Further, team-based bonus plans provide a mechanism by which a more visible 
performance measure can be taken into account at the shop-floor level compared to 
corporate-wide factors. Such incentives schemes encourage team working, but also 
allow employees to experiment with and learn new workplace methods and techniques 
to obtain shared goals and targets. Companies may also use multiple bonus schemes for 
a specific project or operation. For instance, a company may use a short-term ‘hot 
skills’ or ‘star pay’ bonus for specific categories of employees, a ‘milestone bonus’ 
pool, to be disbursed at the discretion of the project director, and a ‘completion bonus’, 
to be awarded to project participants at the end of the project. Such multi-pronged 
project initiatives are just one example of the way companies increasingly use bonuses 
to achieve various corporate and strategic objectives.  
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Other examples of business goals-linked bonuses include schemes such as employee 
retention, personal development, and quality and customer service programs. Retention 
bonuses that are used to entice employees and contractors to stay through a long-term 
project may take a number of forms. In the oil industry, for instance, paying people a 
fixed bonus if they stay beyond a specific deadline is standard practice. Similarly, spot 
bonuses, rewards for performance, premium skills pay and star pay are a common 
practice in many other industries. Recognizing the increasing importance of signing 
and retention bonuses, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), have recently started 
collating data about the incidence of these schemes in private industry. Based on the 
Employment Cost Index data, Moehrle’s (2000) analysis of referral, hiring and 
retention bonus pay plans for the year 2000 provides evidence on the significant role of 
the employment size of the establishment, as midsize and large establishments provide 
more coverage and incur higher hourly costs in connection with these plans. In terms of 
specific sectors, manufacturing, transportation, communications and public utilities, 
and finance, insurance, and real estate incurred bonuses at higher levels. 
 
Companies may target specific bonus schemes at employees’ personal development or 
to encourage individual employees to upgrade their skills in some specific 
areas/specializms. They may, for example, pay cash bonuses linked to employee 
personal development. Under the scheme, employees would be eligible for a cash 
bonus award that may be determined during their formal review. Bonus awards are 
based on the ability to meet specific personal performance goals that have been outlined 
and accessed periodically by both the employee and the employee’s manager. Both 
manufacturing and service concerns now recognize that the more traditional 
single-factor bonus arrangements may need to make explicit allowance for quality  
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standards as well. Schemes that are primarily concerned with productivity or output 
now also include measures of quality to prevent efficiency gains coming at the expense 
of deterioration in service or product standards.  
 
For example, the two-factor bonus operated by Toshiba Information Systems is based 
on output and quality – with both weighted equally. It calculates quality as the number 
of defects found on a daily and monthly basis. Gainsharing plans typically take into 
account productivity and financial targets (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Kim, 1996). In 
many cases, they have expanded to cover a wide variety of performance measures such 
as the level of faults, site absence rate and customer satisfaction (Collins, 1998). 
 
SUBJECTIVITY IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
The wide prevalence of discretion in bonus payments – an outcome of linking bonuses 
to the company’s business goals - has inevitably increased the significance of 
subjectivity in performance evaluation (Ittner and Meyer, 2003). In general, 
performance measures vary in terms of their effect and ability to provide accurate, 
informative, and timely indications of the individual’s contribution to company goals 
(Holmstrom, 1979). For instance, although the quantitative performance measures or 
bi-variate financial ratios mostly used in extant research are simpler to conceptualize 
and easier to calculate, not all aspects of employee performance can be measured by 
these methods. Jobs invariably involve some elements of discretion that are difficult to 
observe and appropriately assign for rewards.  
 
Evaluators therefore use subjective assessments to mitigate problems arising from  
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unobservability and other challenges in performance measurement - for example, when 
bonus plans use a multitude of business goals as performance measures. By taking this 
particular course, evaluators can exploit any additional relevant information that arises 
during the measurement period. 
   
The effects of subjectivity are evident in a number of ways. First, subjectivity reduces 
“noise” in good objective measures such as profit or output. For instance, when 
financial performance is strongly influenced by “uncontrollable” factors (e.g. business 
cycles), it makes sense to use subjective assessment of individual performance to 
neutralize the effects of negative externalities. In the case of bonus payouts, for 
example, subjectivity is used to reduce the risk of bonuses being tied by formulae to 
quantitative performance measures. 
  
Second, subjectivity reduces “distortions” in poor objective measures. Organizations 
ideally use “controllable” (that is, high signal-to-noise ratio) performance measures 
when paying bonuses, as they allow stronger incentives without requiring a high risk 
premium for the employee. The economic rationale for this observation is rooted in the 
traditional agency-theory framework, which suggests that the relative use (weight) of 
particular performance metrics should be a decreasing function of the measure’s noise, 
and an increasing function of the measure’s sensitivity to employee effort or decision 
(Holmstrom 1979; Banker, et al., 2000). 
 
However, the fact that distortion in the performance measure may also drive down  
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incentive strength may limit the use of such measures. For example, some high 
signal-to-noise performance measures (pieces produced in a machine shop) may 
feature heavily in an incentive scheme, while others (key-strokes made by a secretary) 
may receive low weight. It is obvious that in the latter case employees can take actions 
that increase the performance measure without simultaneously increasing 
organizational value. Subjectivity will reduce distortions that sometimes naturally arise 
in objective performance measures, such as those relating to the secretary’s job.  
 
Third, subjectivity can make it easier to adapt to changes in the environment as 
contracts cannot specify or envision every contingency. The use of information that 
arises during the measurement period can be made more effective with the freedom to 
re-weight different dimensions of performance, as appropriate, if the environment 
changes. Easy adaptation to the environment is thus a major feature of subjective 
performance measures. 
 
Contracts often fail to specify what happens in many contingencies and they are not 
always crafted to provide each party with the optimal incentives (Grossman and Hart, 
1986). For example, important aspects of the agreement may be unobservable to one of 
the parties (information is asymmetric) or too costly to prove in court (information is 
‘unverifiable’). 
 
Asymmetric information can lead to incomplete contracts in a number of ways: Party 
A’s fear that if she proposes an addition to the contract Party B will deduce that she has 
private information and either be more reluctant to trade or somehow use that 
information against her. If a manager asks for a minimum weekly output guarantee in a  
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long-term contract, the worker may deduce – rightly or wrongly – that the manager 
does not have alternative sources of labor, and raise the wage demand. 
 
On a simpler level, there is a cost to deciding which contingencies are important and to 
writing the contract clauses themselves. And even if the parties write a simple contract, 
if the dispute goes to court, the court will ‘fill in the blanks’ using default rules designed 
to work well for the typical contract.  
 
Thus, a number of explanations can be offered for why important variables are left out 
of contracts – unobservability, unverifiability, second-best incentives, fear of signalling 
undesirable characteristics, contract-writing costs, and legal default rules. In particular 
instances of manager-employee contracts, any one or more of these factors may cause 
an incomplete contracting outcome. There may then be a role for subjectivity to fill the 
contractual gaps in workplace settings.   
 
Despite all the advantages of subjectivity, observers have noted that there can be major 
difficulties associated with its use in performance evaluation. Because a supervisor’s 
discretion is involved in making a subjective assessment of an employee’s 
performance, it requires that fair, unbiased judgements be made for it to work in the 
interest of both the company and the employee. It is therefore argued that both parties 
(i.e. supervisor and supervisee) will need trust, that the bonus will be paid (Baker, 
Gibbons and Murphy, 1994), that the supervisor would not shirk (Baker, Jensen and 
Murphy, 1988), and that the supervisor would not play favorities (Prendergast and 
Topel, 1996). If the evaluator is unfair and biased, there is a possibility that subjectivity 
will pose a substantial risk to the employee.  
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A typical problem encountered in performance measurement is the tendency of 
evaluators to assign uniform ratings to employees regardless of performance (Zenger, 
1992; Medoff and Abraham, 1980). Because careful appraisals take time away from 
better-rewarded activities, and because evaluators face large nonpecuniary costs from 
disgruntled employees, evaluators have the incentive to shirk their responsibilities. 
Such behavioral trends invariably result in ratings compression that reduces the 
effectiveness of subjectivity in providing fair bonus rewards. 
 
The literature on subjectivity assumes a discretionary role for evaluators to make 
judgements about employee performance by using an appropriate range of performance 
metrics. In addition, a related strand of literature has focused on directly analysing 
alternatives to objective performance measures. Extant management and accounting 
literature on ‘total quality’, ‘balanced scorecards’ and ‘benchmarking’ indicates the 
interest in exploring non-financial aspects of performance. The impetus for these 
alternative performance measures comes from the recognition that objective 
performance measures are inadequate for situations in which multi-tasking and 
multi-skilling play a major role in production and organization. Further, the increased 
intensity of competition has compelled organizations to improve performance in all 
aspects of their productive operations. This requires a closer attention to qualitative 
aspects of production and service delivery, as they have a strong bearing on the level of 
success achieved in the new industrial and commercial environments. 
 
Research in non-financial measures also claims that the conventional emphasis on 
traditional performance measures, such as revenue, operating profit, or economic value 
added, or accounting-based ratios such as return on assets or earnings per share, distract  
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from nonfinancial factors, such as market share, customer satisfaction, product quality, 
and employee satisfaction (Banker, et al., 2000; Miles and Snow, 1978). A low priority 
attached to non-financial measures is likely to harm an organization’s chance to 
compete effectively in its particular market. There is also the suggestion that 
non-financial measures are a better predictor of an organization’s long-term 
performance, and that they help managers to monitor and assess their progress toward 
strategic goals and objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2001). 
 
DETERMINANTS OF SUBJECTIVITY 
 
The study aims to investigate conditions where subjectivity is used effectively in 
performance evaluation. This is achieved by focusing on the factors that render 
financial or objective measures incomplete or ‘noisy’ (e.g. they impose undue risk on 
the employee as these measures are affected by uncontrollables) or when 
formula-based incentive plans distort incentives (e.g. because they are prone to 
manipulation), thus necessitating a supervisor’s discretion. Building on recent research 
in incentives, and on accounting and management literature on non-financial 
performance measures, the study examines a number of factors relevant to the use of 
subjectivity. 
 
Economic Constraints. Economics literature on performance measurement 
hypothesizes that organizations facing a high level of economic uncertainty are likely 
to use subjectivity to a greater extent than objective performance measures (Lazear, 
1998). It is argued that economic constraints impose greater demands on managers to 
try to insulate their workers from outside volatile environments. There exist specific  
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circumstances where variations in output are beyond the workers’ control, thus 
increasing their exposure to risk and volatility. 
 
For example, a bank’s loan officer may receive a negative return from the bank’s 
investment despite conducting thorough research before agreeing a loan. This might 
happen because of an economic downturn. It is difficult, if not impossible, for any loan 
officer to affect the course of macroeconomic events. But the impact on him may occur 
regardless of his efforts. Given a certain level of effort, a loan officer may do better than 
expected when economic conditions are good. This may not be the case when 
conditions are bad. Understandably, employees will be reluctant to have their pay 
contingent on a change in the external environment, but they might be willing to accept 
lower pay if it protects them from extreme volatility.  
 
To the extent that management is willing to filter out uncontrollables, thereby reducing 
the ‘noise’ element in incentive pay plans, they are likely to have a committed 
workforce (Brignall, 1997). Industries face a turbulent economic climate from time to 
time due to significant macroeconomic events. The prevailing practice is to allow 
supervisors to use their judgment to take such factors into consideration. For example, 
Bushman et al (1995) suggest that determinators of CEO pay will make more use of 
subjectivity if accounting measures or stock returns are noisy.  
 
Proposition 1: The level of environmental uncertainty will be positively related to the 
use of subjectivity in incentive rewards.  
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Performance Expectations. Investors’ expectations of companies can be purely 
financial or can focus on both financial performance and more qualitative measures 
(Johnson & Greening, 1999). While traditional performance parameters, such as 
commercial transactions, output and income, are recognised as valuable indicators, the 
broader criteria of efficiency has now become a sine qua non in achieving 
competitiveness in various sectors of the economy. From a commercial perspective, it 
is now imperative not only to outperform competitors on output or income, but also to 
be competitive on service provision and customer satisfaction. As a result, 
organizational processes such as cost, quality and the time bases in the new 
‘hyper-competitive’ environment have acquired a new significance in companies’ 
plans to secure and maintain competitive advantage (Cooper, 1995).  
 
This new emphasis on the specific role of organizational parameters means that 
non-financial indicators such as quality or customer service are assigned higher weights 
in performance measurement (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Euske et al., 1993; Hoque and 
James, 2000). Investors in closer contact with company management recognise the 
importance of such parameters of company performance. Therefore, company financial 
performance is measured against any change in non-financial performance, thus 
requiring a more subjective assessment of changing situations.  
 
Proposition 2: The greater the emphasis on non-financial performance measures, the 
greater the use of subjectivity in the assignment of rewards. 
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Strategic Orientation. Consistent with a large literature on work incentive plans 
(Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001), an organization’s strategic orientation is deemed to 
be a major factor in the design of incentive plans (Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990). 
Strategic concerns play a major role when bonuses are directly linked to measures of 
customer satisfaction, or growth in customer numbers. The traditional issues of 
corporate strategy are concerned with managing a set of natural stakeholders, involving 
dealing with suppliers and customers, and facing certain competition. The issue of 
interest here is how success in managing these relationships is measured and how it is 
reflected in financial performance. 
 
For example, many market strategies are targeted at building company reputation 
among prospective employees and customers. This is based on the assumption that the 
reputation of a company deeply affects its relationship with a critical set of 
stakeholders, including such considerations as: 
 
(i) the company’ stock price; 
(ii) the loss or gain of talented employees; and 
(iii) financial, customer and supplier relations. 
 
In particular, a firm’s ability to hire talent depends, to a significant extent, on the 
perception of the company, rather than on what actually occurs within the workplace. 
By following practices such as paying bonuses in a bonus month, many companies 
strive to follow a market strategy of maintaining a reputation as a generous employer 
with a sound market position (Nisar, 2003). Bonuses may also be directly linked to the 
recruitment and retention of key workers. Strategic goals such as these are liable to  
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introduce a greater amount of discretion in incentive plans. When market strategies 
such as enhancing company reputation become a priority in bonus payouts, any impact 
of this on individual performance needs to be fully taken into account in actual bonus 
practices. 
 
Proposition 3: Higher weight given to the organization’s strategy (e.g. retention of 
employees or growth in customer numbers) will lead toward a greater role for 
subjectivity in incentive rewards.  
 
Organizational Characteristics. Organizational characteristics, such as the size, 
nature or type of business, may determine the range of possible changes in 
organizational systems – for example, in a performance measurement system (Karimi 
et al., 1996; Thompson, 1967). For instance, studies have found that larger 
organizations tend to use balanced scorecards to a greater extent than smaller 
organisations (Hoque and James, 2000). Other studies have looked at the impact of 
organizational processes on performance measurement systems: the process of service 
costing may differ from one service process type to another (Miles and Sweeting, 
1988), and cost traceability varies systematically in different service processes or types, 
namely mass, shop, and professional (Brignall et al., 1991). This implies that 
organizational characteristics may also significantly affect the assignment of rewards.  
 
Proposition 4: Larger organizations are more likely to employ subjectivity in the 
allocation of rewards from an incentive pay plan.  
 
In empirical tests, the size variable may be important because it might correlate both  
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with the type and amount of incentive provided, as well as with a variety of other 
corporate practices, such as the degree of decentralization. It might also be correlated 
with the manager’s human capital, ability and marginal product of effort, since larger 
organizations may hire more talented managers. 
 
Incompleteness. In organizational settings where jobs involve multi-task and 
multi-skill performance characteristics, compensation contracts are invariably 
incomplete. As the multi-task economic models predict, employees will therefore 
direct their effort only to measured tasks and may ignore other 
important-but-unmeasured tasks (e.g. they focus on improving short-term profits but 
not market share) (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994). Formula-based performance 
measures take inadequate account of the unmeasured dimensions of jobs, thus resulting 
in major inefficiencies.  
 
Ideal practice encourages compensation contracts to use all possible information about 
the outcome of an employee’s effort on company value, properly weighted, so that 
incentives are appropriately balanced across the different dimensions of the job 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). The void arising from distortions due to 
multi-tasking (or for that matter, the use of ‘poor’ objective performance measures as 
discussed above) can be filled by using subjectivity in measuring those aspects of the 
job that are not easily quantifiable. Similarly, because it is prohibitively costly to 
specify terms of trade that cover every conceivable state and contingency, subjective 
evaluations can be made after the state is revealed.  
 
Proposition 5: Greater use of subjectivity in incentive rewards will be observed when  
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contracts are incomplete. 
 
Investment In Intangibles. Organizations recognize that a big part of their true value 
depends upon intangible factors such as organizational knowledge, customer 
satisfaction, product innovation and employee morale, rather than on physical assets 
such as real estate. As Ulrich and Smallwood (2004) argue, ‘such organizational 
capabilities are key intangible assets. These capabilities – the collective skills, abilities, 
and expertise of an organization – are the outcome of investments in staffing, training, 
compensation, communication, and other human resources areas. They represent the 
ways that people and resources are brought together to accomplish work (p. 119)’.  
 
However, since measuring human capabilities and performance cannot be done in 
precisely the same language as accounting for assets, liabilities, and equity, incentive 
schemes have to be designed in such a way that fully recognise the value of such assets. 
While the trend toward linking bonuses with a company’s business goals reflect these 
developments, it is also possible that these plans result in an increased level of 
investment in employee skills and capabilities. For example, in many industrial and 
service sectors, the most significant long-term investment in intangible assets is in 
providing training in areas such as improved customer service.  
 
Understanding and measuring the role of intangible factors in value creation poses a 
formidable challenge. Lev and Zarowin (1999) argue that nonrecognition of intangibles 
has caused a significant decline in the relevance and usefulness of company 
information systems. There are concerns that ‘arcane’ accounting rules devised for a 
bricks-and-mortar economy may be ill-suited to an economy in which many companies  
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derive their competitive advantage from investments in intangibles. In these situations, 
it is likely that management will use subjective assessments in incentive pay to 
encourage the acquisition and utilization of intangible assets by its employees. 
  
Proposition 6: Company demand for intangible assets will make greater use of 
subjectivity in bonus rewards. 
 
Management literature frequently observes a tendency among managers to focus on the 
short-term and ignore the long run implications of their actions. This is because the 
time horizons of managers differ from those of investors. Because the stock price of the 
company reflects the capitalized value of future profits, an action that increases future 
profits makes the company more valuable to investors, who can enjoy the higher profits 
through future dividends or unanticipated capital gains. Investors therefore want 
managers to take actions that increase the long term value of the company. But a 
manager may be more concerned about securing short term personal benefits than 
maximising the long term value of the company. Specifically, when actions cannot be 
observed easily by owners, managers may have an incentive to take decisions that may 
have adverse long term consequences. 
 
For example, in the pursuit of short-term financial gains managers may avoid making 
investments in projects with long-term payoff yields. Therefore, paying managers 
based on current accounting earnings rather than long-run project value provides no 
incentives to take decisions today that increase future profits. Economics-based agency 
models therefore emphasize the informativeness of performance measures used. A 
related solution is to use subjectivity to mitigate an excessively short term focus.  
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Murphy and Oyer (2002) and Bushman et al (1995) predict that executive pay will 
make greater use of subjectivity according to the level of importance accorded to 
growth opportunities or long product cycles.  
 
Proposition 7: The short term focus of formula-based bonus plans will be positively 
related to the use of subjectivity in assigning rewards. 
 
Organizational Interdependency. The now widely held view that all relevant 
categories of employees should be covered by an incentive reward is a direct corollary 
of recent changes in the organisation of production and service delivery. This is 
because: (i) the pay differentials among different categories are steadily shrinking, and 
(ii) everybody contributes to the services rendered by a particular organizational unit. 
Since accountability in these organizations rests on front-line workers, it makes sense 
to cover all these workers in an incentive pay plan. 
 
To put this observation into its correct economic context, we need to consider the 
current climate of employment and wage practices. The last two decades have seen 
major changes in the demand for skilled workers in industrialized countries. There are 
three discernible trends: first is the growth of non-manual wages and employment 
relative to manual workers. This is accompanied by a worsening of the position of the 
unskilled, relative to the skilled. Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) use a panel of 
manufacturing industries from 1960 to 1980 to find that the implementation of new 
technologies, proxied by the age of the capital stock, increases the share of the highly 
educated in total labor cost. At the same time, the decline of employment among 
manual workers has been disproportionately concentrated among unskilled workers.  
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Finally, there is the evidence of widening wage inequality within skill categories 
(including the unskilled)(see Mincer, 1989). 
 
Since the number of educated workers in the labor force has increased overall, this 
should normally have driven down wage differentials. This is obviously not what has 
happened. It is therefore suggested that education has become more valuable in periods 
of rapid technological change, and that it takes more education to cope with the 
constraints imposed by new productive systems. This has led many authors to conclude 
that technology and human capital are relative complements (Kremer and Maskin, 
1996; Acemoglu, 1998).  
 
This implies that workers of different skill-levels are imperfect substitutes, and that 
output is more sensitive to skill in some tasks than in others. As a result, organizations 
tend to specialise in one skill level or another, rather than employing workers with all 
skill types. This subsequently creates an incentive for the segregation of workers into 
different sets of organizations, as the complementarity between the tasks promotes self- 
(i.e. assortative) matching; consider, for example, the case of Microsoft. New 
information technology has, in particular, spurred the move towards the 
complementarity of tasks (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1998). Recent 
organizational changes such as flat hierarchies, horizontal networking and 
team-building reflect these trends. This has important implications for incentive pay 
plans.  
 
It is likely that those incentive schemes that encourage team work and cooperation will 
benefit from extant organizational complementarities. For example, paying a  
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departmental manager strictly on unit profits provides no incentives to cooperate with 
other departments in exploiting cross-selling opportunities. The optimality condition 
requires that all related employees are provided with the same set of incentives so as to 
benefit from interdependencies. Flexible organizations facilitate teamwork relating to 
an interdependent technology (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Such systems aim to put in 
place a complementary set of human resource management practices, including profit 
sharing strategies, that encourage employee involvement. 
 
Consequently, bonus plans linked to business goals are designed to cover all relevant 
categories of employees (e.g. all shop-floor employees). The extent of bonus coverage 
will however depend upon the scope of organizational interdependency in production 
or service delivery, measured by the subjective assessments of evaluators.  
 
Proposition 8: The larger the organizational interdependency, the larger the 
requirements are for subjective assessments in incentive pay plans. 
 
Performance Measure Flexibility. The value associated with maintaining a 
predictable level of service quality, offering innovative products, updating customer 
service facilities and keeping trained staff accessible by each customer is often fully 
recognized by companies in competitive environments. Difficulties arise however 
when they are less certain about how this mix of facilities - a broad menu of service 
products, employees, shop-floor operations and delivery options - can be accounted for. 
 
Under each of the above-mentioned broad categories a number of indicators could be 
listed, ranging from financial to non-financial performance measures. This and other  
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similar strategies in this direction lead to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a 
single operational efficiency criterion. The use of a selective performance measure 
would give only a restricted, incomplete picture of the process and may fail to account 
for the interactions between different job dimensions, leading to sub-optimal results. 
Another related problem is the tendency for seemingly informative performance 
measures to ‘degrade’ or become dysfunctional when they are used for incentive 
purposes, as has been noted by many practitioners. For instance, John Darley, a 
psychologist who has studied dysfunction in control systems, calls this problem ‘How 
Good Numbers Go Bad’ (Darley, 1991).  
 
Consider the use of customer satisfaction as a performance measure in an employee 
bonus plan. Customer satisfaction has become synonymous with good management 
practice as successful companies are often the ones with a record of higher levels of 
customer satisfaction. Many incentives schemes have been designed in the past that pay 
for happy customers. However, this is too dangerous a strategy to motivate employees 
as there are simply too many ways to increase customer satisfaction without increasing 
performance. It would not be very difficult for employees to curry favor with customers 
by indulging them in non-profit-maximising ways, thus driving down the company’s 
profits. On the other hand, even when employee incentives are not tied to customer 
satisfaction, there is always a possibility of finding a high correlation between customer 
satisfaction and company performance (hence the motivation for tying both sets of 
variables in the first place).  
 
To circumvent these problems, supervisors are likely to base their subjective 
assessments on a broader set of qualitative performance indicators. For instance, it will  
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be more appropriate to link bonus with group performance and fix norms of group 
performance to make it more practical. Appropriate weights could then be assigned to 
non-financial objectives vis-à-vis financial ones so as to minimize the effect of an 
inverse relationship between these two sets of factors. Weights may be attached to 
different parameters of performance on the basis of their relative importance and, if 
possible, an aggregate index may be devised. The movement of this index from year to 
year would indicate relative improvement or otherwise in the working of the bank.  
 
Proposition 9a: A broader set of qualitative performance measures will increase the 
scope for subjective assessments in deciding bonus rewards. 
 
Within such complex work environments, companies will also use performance 
standards or targets that encompass the interactions between different job dimensions. 
Murphy (2000) has emphasized the role of performance targets in communicating the 
expected levels of performance to employees. For instance, bonuses are paid only when 
certain performance thresholds are achieved. However, the benefit that can be derived 
from setting performance targets may be restricted by the difficulty experienced in 
achieving those targets. Job complexity or changes in the environment may render the 
targets unattainable, thus reducing the incentive effect of the pay plans. Subjective 
assessments can be used to make adjustments to performance targets in such particular 
environments.  
 
Proposition 9b: Subjectivity will be used to provide flexibility in measuring employee 
effort against set performance targets. 
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However, new trends in the organization of work in some sectors of the economy has 
made it possible to specify more accurately performance targets - a factor especially 
responsible for the payment of large bonuses in the financial services industry over the 
last few years. For example, greater emphasis on controls and process means that credit 
and risk professionals are now seen as equally important as the front-end specialists. 
With the recent increase in trading volumes plus the growth of new and more structured 
and technical products, opportunities in risk management have increased accordingly. 
As a result, the risk professional has become an important figure in the financial 
industry and is no longer considered to have merely a supporting role. This is in 
contrast to the traditional front office responsible for deriving the deals (e.g. a merger 
deal). A better definition of job activities means that risk professionals feel their bonus 
should be tied on to the front office, as a reflection of their input into the organization. 
Similar trends resulting from more structured products and services can be observed for 
other job categories. 
 
In general, bonus rewards are dependent upon employees hitting a minimum effort 
threshold (A*) as shown in Fig 1. Bonus pay increases in some proportion to the 
increase in effort from point A*. This dependence of a bonus reward on meeting 
threshold targets underlines the importance of accurately measuring effort levels. With 
more structured jobs though it is possible to better design performance targets that 
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PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF SUBJECTIVITY 
 
There are many ways in which subjectivity reduces distortions in employee 
compensation plans; however, inefficiencies may also arise from its use. Employees 
may engage in influence activities, whereby they attempt to curry favor with 
supervisors to obtain better evaluations; this will make it difficult for the company to 
weed out bad quality workers. Further, employees may also manipulate effort to make 
themselves look good in the eyes of their evaluators, again creating inefficiencies.  
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Moreover, if there is disagreement between the employee and the evaluator over the 
performance yardsticks used in the evaluation process, this could lead toward employee 
dissatisfaction and, ultimately, large-scale quits. The problem can be partially resolved 
by establishing reasonable expectations for performance evaluation goals. 
 
This discussion suggests that there can be two equally likely outcomes from using 
subjectivity. Subjectivity can improve formal incentive contracts by reducing 
employee risk and creating an alignment of interest between the employee and the 
employer. But in the absence of an evaluator giving a sound judgement subjectivity can 
also create substantial risk for employees. It will therefore be difficult to make an a 
priori assumption about the impact that subjectivity will have on employee 
performance. 
 
However, a strand of literature emphasizes the role of trust in alleviating 
implementation problems associated with subjectivity. For example, Lawler (1971) 
suggests that greater trust increases the effectiveness of incentive plans. Folger and 
Konovsky (1989) find a positive relationship between the employee’s satisfaction with 
their performance evaluation and trust. It can therefore be argued that the practice of 
subjectivity can be strengthened by establishing a trusting relationship between the 
employee and the evaluator. This in turn will result in improved employee 
performance. 
 
Proposition 10: The greater the level of trust the higher the level of pay satisfaction 
and productivity resulting from the use of subjectivity in assigning rewards. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Research in incentives has tended to focus on non-linearities in the pay-performance 
relation and the consequences of using dysfunctional performance measures. It seldom 
discusses the role of subjectivity in creating optimum incentives for better employee 
performance. This study fills this gap by discussing the causes and effects of 
subjectivity in incentive pay plans. Further, by emphasizing contextual factors, this 
study also draws attention to the importance of previously neglected organizational 
factors, especially organizational strategy, investment in training, target difficulty, and 
organizational interdependency. 
 
Virtually all incentive contracts require some elements of subjectivity in evaluating 
employee performance. The use of subjectivity reduces employee risk and increases the 
alignment of interests between the employee and the company. The analysis reported 
here suggests that environmental uncertainty encourages managers to use subjectivity 
to mitigate employee exposure to excessive risk and volatility. Subjectivity thus 
provides a mechanism by which organizations neutralize the negative effects of 
uncontrollable external elements. 
 
Our analysis suggests that the more competitive the environment, the greater the drive 
to improve organizational performance. This in turn accelerates organizational 
awareness of subjective performance metrics. Services such as quality, promptness, 
reliability, timeliness, and value for money or economy/affordability are part of a range 
of measures used to improve non-financial performance. Better outcomes in these areas 
lead toward improvements in the company's overall performance. Subjectivity  
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therefore provides linkages for the development of a comprehensive system of 
company performance management through its effect on the evaluation of 
organizational performance metrics.  
 
Subjectivity is also useful in complex work environments where the job design 
involves multiple tasks and substantial decision-making. For example, many jobs in an 
organization are connected to more than one type of service, thus making it difficult to 
allocate precisely the total labor input into the job as between the different services. 
Subjective assessment of the whole situation ensures an efficient assignment of 
rewards. From our analysis, it appears that a greater use of subjectivity in environments 
of organizational interdependency is important. There is also an argument for the use of 
a broader set of qualitative performance indicators. 
 
Criticisms of traditional bonus schemes rest on the premise that reward practices 
generally fail to take adequate account of employee performance in all dimensions. In 
spite of the difficulties inherent in measuring productivity, the desirability of linking 
bonus to performance has been evidenced by previous research. Our own research 
suggests that subjectivity is a mechanism by which appropriate linkages can be 
established between incentives and employee performance.  
 
This is a critical finding, as the evolution of discretionary bonus pay plans reflects the 
influence of a host of organizational factors that interplay with the bonus decision. 
Rapid technological and organizational changes, and the wide diffusion of skill-driven 
productive systems, have played an important role in the creation of these new 
prospects. Bonus pay plans have emerged as a key strategic device to help create value  
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from the application of such systems. There is also large anecdotal evidence that 
suggests that for skill-driven productive systems to be useful in these environments, 
they need to be carried out in conjunction with a complementary set of measures that 
augment their effectiveness (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). 
 
For instance, multi-skill training will be of little use in improving productivity if work 
tasks are divided and assigned into small segments; on the other hand, training will 
deliver improvements if connected to broad-based work-related activities; and for both 
these measures to improve the organization of production, some participation in 
shop-floor decision-making and a share of financial return will be needed. Thus, one 
measure is more valuable when other complementary variables are also put in place, 
and conversely, less than optimal outcomes may result if various elements of an 
intervention program are not well coordinated.  
 
This suggests the need for a fit between bonus pay plans and an organization’s existing 
set of capabilities and processes. For instance, bonuses for quality output will only 
produce positive outcomes if the company’s operational procedures are geared toward 
minimizing defective items. Similarly, in the case of a recruitment bonus, the company 
would be required to determine that, in absence of the bonus, the company would 
encounter difficulty in filling the position. This may happen because the company has 
introduced a new technological or organizational system that involves difficult-to-fill 
positions, resulting from a lack of skilled workers within the company, and/or special 
qualifications needed in the position. Thus, in this case, the change in the existing 
system warrants the introduction of a special bonus offer. Such bonus rewards will 
make effective use of subjectivity as they draw upon existing organizational practices  
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to help devise and implement appropriate incentive regimes. 
 
Since a well-structured incentive scheme may be highly visible and the outcome may 
have far reaching consequences for the employees involved, problems such as 
performance goal setting, the development of achievement measures in specific units, 
the provision of supportive environments, the laying down of norms acceptable to both 
the parties, and the scale of payment which will appropriately index achievement with 
bonus, etc. are bound to arise in the implementation of an incentive pay plan. These 
problems would vary from industry to industry and from unit to unit and would need to 
be resolved by taking into account the company’s specific organizational and 
technological capabilities and the extent to which bonuses advance the value of such 
specific assets.  
  
In sum, basing pay on subjective performance assessments can improve the formal 
performance evaluation system by reducing dysfunctional incentives associated with 
“narrow” measures (such as accounting earnings or divisional profits) and by reducing 
the risk of overly broad performance measures (such as company profits). In addition, 
state-contingent discretionary bonuses allow incomplete contracts to adapt to changing 
market or technological environments. A major limitation of the present research 
pertains to the very concept of subjectivity. As indicated earlier, subjectivity can only 
usefully be applied if there is trust between supervisor and the employee. There is also 
scope for conflict over the way subjective measures are used for employee 
performance. Although substantial progress has been made relating to the determinants 
and effects of the use of subjectivity, further research could examine the behavioral 
issues that arise from the use of subjectivity. This may involve case study research of a  
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